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Abstract
Regulation theory rarely considers the disruptive capacity of technology, nor regulation in 
the sole interest of government. This paper will investigate the capacity of technology to 
disrupt regulatory regimes surrounding surveillance and communications infrastructure in 
various countries. As policy regimes are updated to meet new challenges, through the 
creation of new policy habitats, new powers are created despite protests and claims of 
technological neutrality. However, the capacity to interpret technology does not end: 
technology will disrupt even the new habitat, requiring renegotiation and re-settlements. 
Such negotiations often occur at the international level; some of these processes will be 
reviewed and critiqued. Considering the contingent nature of technology policy, this paper 
then recommends some ways forward when considering new national policies, such as the 
process that South Africa is about to embark on.
Technology, interests and statutory powers
Despite arguments even in liberal economies such as the US about hesitating to regulate the nascent on-
line industry (1), there are many movements towards legislation on information and communications 
technologies in the interests of the state. Particularly, governments have been committed for quite some 
time in working towards ensuring that their surveillance and investigative capabilities are maintained in 
the "digital age". Consider how governments tried to control the proliferation and use of cryptography (2)
under the justification and concern:
Encryption, as a practical matter, diminishes the power of law enforcement to do its job, and 
we seek only the way to maintain the original status quo. The consequences of our losing the 
ability to wiretap would be enormous. (3)
The US policy on controlling market access to cryptography eventually weakened allowing for market 
liberalisation, particularly because "maintaining the status quo" was considered to be onerous on industry, 
and in direct conflict with individual rights, including the right to privacy; if not also infeasible. 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom when the controversial surveillance-enabling statute, the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Bill was introduced to the House of Commons, the Home Office Minister stated 
Jack Straw: This is an important Bill, and represents a significant step forward for the 
protection of human rights in this country. Human rights considerations have dominated its 
drafting. None of the law enforcement activities specified in the Bill is new. What is new is 
that, for the first time, the use of these techniques will be properly regulated by law and 
externally supervised. That will serve to ensure that law enforcement and other operations 
are consistent with the duties imposed on public authorities by the European convention on 
human rights and by the Human Rights Act 1998. (4)
In the course of a long debate, it was finally acknowledged that the powers were indeed new, and the 
consistency with the Human Rights Act was not clear. When the RIP Bill reached the House of Lords, the 
Lords Home Office Minister stated 
Although, strictly speaking, the [forced decryption] power is new, it arises only as a response 
to developments in technology. Technology has the potential to limit considerably the 
capabilities of law enforcement and other agencies in preventing crime. The [forced 
decryption] power in the Bill will go some way towards redressing the balance. (5)
Unlike the US policy on cryptography (key escrow particularly), the RIP Bill became law, receiving 
Royal Assent in July 2000, despite industry and NGO concerns regarding costs and individual rights. (6)
As old traditions such as interception of communications, search and seizure, and access to 
communications traffic/transactional data are adapted or updated to meet the technological challenges of 
digital communications infrastructure, the required powers are not a case of maintaining old powers, but 
rather are increases in powers due to the nature of the technology itself (7). This article will show how 
new technology disrupted old statutory powers and will follow some new government policies to deal 
with this problem. However, this article will argue that these new policies result in greater powers than 
previously held, again because of the nature of the technology itself. South Africa has slowly developed 
its cybercrime statutory proposals (8) as it awaited the outcome of the Council of Europe (CoE) Draft 
Convention on Cybercrime (9). This article will end with warning notes to countries about to embark on a 
national process, drawn from experiences with the CoE, the G8, and various national processes. 
Technology as a disruption of the status quo
Contemporary literature in most disciplines discusses technology as a disruptive force to the status quo. 
New technologies harm the environment; new technologies help the environment but change policies 
(consider Kyoto). New technologies transform the way organisations operate, or management structures 
(consider Business Process Re-engineering). Even the regulation literature notes that information 
technologies can change the nature of regulated industries, as in Peltzman (10) on the sources of pressure 
for deregulation, being 
... changes in the 'politics' and changes in the 'economics' of the regulated industries. Political 
change includes such things as shifts in the relative political power of contending groups and 
changes in the underlying organization and information technologies (p.108). 
Peltzman continues that technology is a disruptive force on regulations such as in interest-rate regulation 
(p.121) to telecommunications regulation (p.117). 
Likewise, Hood (11) [1994, p. 11] reports on various theories on the reversals of policy, including the 
cause of a "loss of policy habitat" that can be a result of structural changes such as the change of 
technology. This purported habitat consists of the particular social structures that existed at the time of 
policy formation; technology can force a change in this habitat. Unfortunately such lines of investigation 
tend to focus on post-industrial society theories that overplay the role of society, or otherwise treat 
technology as deterministic, and as a result suffers from the valid critiques of such theories (p.12). Hood 
also argues 
And social change is not necessarily an independent factor from which everything else 
stems. It may itself be a product of other policies, designed to 'shape' preferences. [...] Such 
explanations are often claimed by their critics to be too 'technocentric', leaving too little 
room for the autonomous dynamics of politics (pp.12-13). 
However, even as he moves on to investigate other theories, such as Chicago School interest-based 
theories for policy reversals, he notes that interest-based views also lack clear articulations of the role 
played by "broader sociotechnical developments", since few accounts "put this element at centre stage 
and it seems at best to have been part of the background" (p.36). This article intends to bring the 
technology into the foreground, but without attributing deterministic status to the technology either; the 
interests of both the human and non-human actors are essential (12) (13). Therefore, placing the 
technology in the foreground is the immediate task; and the search for more regarding its disruptive role 
may lead to a better understanding of regulatory issues generally. 
What is it, therefore, with technology that causes such regulatory change? Let us look specifically at the 
procedural powers being discussed, and the technological infrastructures that are changing. 
Towards new interception and access to transactional data regimes 
Traditional telephony, i.e., plain old telephone system which operated through circuit-switching, allowed 
for alligator clips to be attached to lines and clear and simple interception. Likewise, transactional data 
was not difficult to accumulate: who calls who, for how long, at what time of the day, are all recorded in 
some form by the telcos anyway. As the infrastructure became more and more complex, interception 
regimes became more detailed. There are three significant technological developments that affected the 
powers of investigation: digital switches involving circuit-switched technology; packet-switched 
communication infrastructure, such as the Internet and digital circuit-switched communication, such as 
mobile phones. 
 Digital switches made interception and access to transactional data difficult because of the 
complexity and speed at which switches would operate. Concerned with this development in the 
US, the Department of Justice negotiated with Industry and the Electronic Freedom Frontier (14) to 
find a solution: the 1996 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). 
CALEA required intercept capability and access to transactional data be built in to switching 
technology; and the US Government would pay for all such changes made by 1995, and 500 
million USD in subsidies for 1995 to 1998. CALEA was restricted to circuit-switching 
technologies such as the plain-old-telephone system, though subsequently extended to mobile 
communications; the negotiators intentionally avoided dealing with internet communications on 
that occasion. (15)
 Packet-switched communications infrastructures, such as the Internet pose greater problems to 
interception capabilities and access to transactional data. The technological challenges are 
numerous [2000, p. 6] (16) and the resulting costs are up for debate, sometimes heated (17). 
Predominant challenges to intercepting e-mail include identifying data streams, identifying users, 
cross-border searching, and tapping specific data streams without intercepting all streams (and thus 
failing the European Convention on Human Rights requirements on proportionality and 
specificity). Traffic/transactional data is a new conundrum of its own: what is transactional data 
within this technological environment? Is it every website that a suspect visits or is it the details to 
specific e-mails? What of web-based mail? And traffic data collection also has its own costs issues, 
particularly storage requirements that are non-trivial. 
 While the US chose to concentrate specifically on circuit-switched communications under 
CALEA, many other governments are working on policies of technological neutrality. The UK, for 
example, chose to update its Interception of Communications Act 1985 with the RIP Act 2001 by 
referring to communications services providers, as such a term emcompassed Internet Service 
Providers, Mobile Phone service providers, and traditional telephone companies, whereas the 1985 
act referred only to public telecommunications operators. The costs may be reimbursed for the 
intercept capability development at some CSPs, from a likely 20 million pounds set aside by the 
Home Office. Likewise, the Dutch Telecommunications Act 1996 makes no distinction between 
different telecommunication networks or services, and as a result its laws requiring intercept 
capability, apply to all communications infrastructure, without regard to costs incurred by industry. 
The Australians also have a common view of technological neutrality: all infrastructures are built 
equal, as are all warrants (paid by government) and capability requirements (paid by industry). 
Towards securing access to secured communications 
A key advantage to digital communications from the perspective of security is that they can be encrypted 
with limited effects on efficiency. Mobile telephone communications that are digital are encrypted 
between the handset and the base station. Likewise, e-mails can be encrypted to the recipient, rendering 
communications difficult to decrypt in transit. Previous government policies such as Key Escrow or Key 
Recovery have proved unsuccessful, as well as attempts to limit the existence or export of cryptographic 
products have also proved problematic, partly because of their importance in establishing trust and 
confidence (18) in electronic commerce particularly (19).
This situation has been of some concern to governments, particularly owing to their policy failures, and 
also owing to their continued insistence on being able to gain access to all communications, irrespective 
of the medium and security measures applied. Under the spectre of terrorism, paedophiles, and people 
and drugs trafficking, the UK Government was the first Western government to implement the statutory 
power for forced decryption, or forced disclosure of decryption keys. That is, under Chapter III of the 
RIP Act 2000, law enforcement authorities can force an individual to hand over their key used to protect 
communications, as well as force decryption of communications that have been intercepted; failure to do 
so may result in a two-year sentence (seven years in a similar policy in India). 
Disruption leading to a new habitat 
As a result of changing technologies, some governments have been moving to create new policies, or 
alter older ones, in order to maintain their powers. This changes the structure of the habitat, however, the 
socio-technical environment will inevitably change as a result, possibly with new challenges. 
Governments wish to maintain the status quo with regards to their interception, access to transactional 
data, and ability to read the product of interceptions. If the South African government wishes to maintain 
its capabilities and ensure the status quo, it may have to consider similar policies. However, there are 
associated risks, as the technology remains disruptive. 
Technology as a disruptive factor
Technology disrupting the policy habitat of traditional surveillance was the grounds for new policies and 
a new habitat. However, the result is that the technology remains disruptive. 
Disruption of civil liberties 
The arising controversy and concern from these policies of interception, access to transactional data, and 
cryptographic keys are linked directly to the technological infrastructure and also its disruptive capacity. 
The difficulties and costs behind intercepting and accumulating transactional data at digital-switches were 
due to the costs involved in building such capabilities. The costs of intercepting and accumulating 
transactional data of mobile telephony are only now being understood, particularly as non-public 
agreements between mobile phone developers and government agencies are being uncovered for GSM 
(20) that was forcibly weakened, and even Third Generation mobile phones (21) that appear to have been 
designed for interception. 
Interception capabilities aside, there are the arising risks, as introduced by the US FBI, of "black boxes" 
such as the controversial Carnivore systems (recently renamed DCS1000). Carnivore is a system 
introduced at ISPs in the US who are unable to intercept traffic; Carnivore, when attached to the network, 
is promised to isolate the specific data flow of interest and be able to completely monitor all email 
communications and all websites, conversations, etc., that occurred while installed. A furore arose when 
this was made public - from both the civil liberties and technological standpoints. The technological 
concerns included: the challenges of isolating and reconstructing the intended traffic of a specific 
individual without confusing it with other traffic; that Carnivore might damage ISP networks because the 
one-size-fits-all approach of Carnivore does not match ISP architectures that always vary; and the lack of 
openness to ensure that the warrant request and the system configuration are directly mapped. As two 
leading computer security experts state: "Unfortunately, there's no systematic way to be sure that any 
system as complex and sensitive as Carnivore works as it is supposed to." (22)
From these technological concerns about Carnivore also arise the civil liberties concerns; particularly that 
are argued as 
The Carnivore system gives law enforcement email interception capabilities that were never 
contemplated when Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) …
Carnivore raises new legal issues that cry out for Congressional attention if we are to 
preserve Fourth Amendment rights in the digital age.
Civil libertarians are concerned directly with the technology, as they continue 
But unlike the operation of a traditional a pen register, trap and trace device, or wiretap of a 
conventional phone line, Carnivore gives the FBI access to all traffic over the ISP's network, 
not just the communications to or from a particular target. Carnivore, which is capable of 
analyzing millions of messages per second, purportedly retains only the messages of the 
specified target, although this process takes place without scrutiny of either the ISP or a court 
(23). Moreover, civil libertarians raise a subtle point that has significant implications 
regarding transactional data. In reporting regarding a previous testimony to the House on the 
issue [a witness] detailed his client's concerns that a trap and trace order in the context of the 
Internet revealed information that Congress did not contemplate when it authorized their 
limited use. In the traditional telephone context, those orders reveal nothing more than the 
numbers dialed to or from a single telephone line. In the Internet context, these orders and 
certainly Carnivore, are likely involve ascertaining the suspect's e-mail address, as well as 
header information that may provide information regarding the content of the 
communication. 
Such devices give more than just that - if transactional data access is extended beyond traditional 
communications, it may consist of mapping out exactly which websites and files were accessed during a 
session. If defined in this way, it is a significant increase in the powers of law enforcement, as it is akin to 
monitoring someone walking down a High Street, looking at exactly what they look at, which books they 
review, which shoes they want to buy, and whatever else catches their eye. 
Finally, the Government Access to Keys (GAK) power gives rise to risks to civil liberties. If governments 
access a private-decryption key of an individual, they will be able to decrypt all past traffic encrypted to 
that key, and all future traffic as well. If GAK policies allow access to keys also used for signatures 
(which is not the case in the UK), governments could then digitally sign documents in the name of the 
suspect. Because of the structure of the technology, this impacts individual rights again as this time 
individuals are forced to participate in the investigation into their life, regardless of their guilt or 
innocence. That is, law enforcement agents will show up at their door and request their keys, or for them 
to hand over decrypted data. This is a highly controversial power, however; particularly on grounds of 
burden-of-proof and self-incrimination which may conflict with European Convention on Human Rights 
and resulting jurisprudence. (24)
As a result, just as technology may have changed and disrupted previous government capabilities and 
policies, technology under a new policy habitat (be it specific such as CALEA or neutral such as in 
Australia and the Netherlands, or new generalised policies as within the UK) can work to be even more 
invasive than before; and thus a disruption of civil liberties. Moreover, technology may be designed 
specifically for the new policy habitat, that of renewed government surveillance, thereby minimising risks 
and costs while still producing product. This appears to be case with the next-generation mobile phones 
that have intercept capabilities designed within the protocols. Regardless of this, cost issues must also be 
considered. 
Disruptions to new policy habitat 
Technology does not necessarily become mute the moment a new habitat is created, as there are still 
limitations to this new policy habitat. Technologies can still be disruptive to new policy, particularly 
under the creation of "substitute products just outside of the regulatory 'ring-fence' ", as Hood explains
If regulation follows the classic 'client politics' pattern, with costs diffused among a scattered 
group of consumers and benefits concentrated on a small, well-organized producer group, 
there may be a point at which unregulated producers start to offer near-substitutes to the 
regulated product. Such a move could trigger a dynamic process which causes the whole 
regulatory structure to unwind, culminating in a situation in which the original 'client politics' 
group start to lead the move to deregulation. 
The US subsidy scenario for CALEA and telcos (non-ISP) resulted in a client politics environment with a 
fence: telcos have to adhere to CALEA, but ISPs do not. Moreover, cable companies now provide 
Internet capabilities, and they fall under the Cable Act rather than CALEA. It is only natural that the US 
Government will wish to extend its policy to reach these other industries (and for telcos to be unhappy 
until this is done). It in fact attempted to do this in the summer of 2000, but the legislative schedule did 
not permit it. This is a case of regulatory convergence. CALEA could perhaps be extended without 
requiring its demise, but this would require a new settlement. 
However, if non-US regulated service providers could also provide access for American citizens, then the 
capacity to intercept communications through required intercept capabilities is legally lost. Even then, 
CALEA has reached out beyond. In one case, the FBI blocked TMI, a Canadian satellite company, from 
providing services to US users; a settlement arose with an agreement that TMI's switch would be on U.S. 
soil (25). Another interesting situation, arose with NTT's acquisition of Verio, a US-based 
telecommunications provider (including Internet). On the grounds of an espionage risk, because the 
Japanese NTT would have access to U.S. government wiretapping activity and could present an 
espionage risk, the US Government at first opposed the merger. This was the first time national-security 
reviews similar to those surrounding past aerospace and defence deals have been applied to an 
international Internet acquisition. (26)
CALEA does not cover Internet traffic. CALEA was not intended to, as it does not cover what it calls 
"information services", the most prominent of which is "electronic messaging" – e-mail, instant 
messaging, etc. It could be extended, but it would face opposition. Rather, in 1999, the Department of 
Justice in the US decided to deal with the messaging problem in 1999 by approaching the Internet 
Engineering Task Force, asking this open body that develops standards for the Internet, to set standards 
that allows for intercept capability. After an open debate, the measure was rejected by the membership of 
the IETF. Carnivore then arrived. It appears that the disruptive force of technology arose and created a 
new infrastructure that did not fit the shape and mould of a specific regulation like CALEA. 
With more technology neutral policies, a ring-fence also exists, but it is not in the form of a specific 
medium. Because these are neutral policies that state that communications infrastructure must allow for 
intercept capability, this includes the Internet. However, in situations such as these, three forms of 
opposition arose from the technology. First, the inordinate costs, second technological circumvention, 
and third, regulatory arbitrage/competition. 
 Inordinate costs: consider the situation in the Netherlands, where the government was among the 
first to advocate interception capabilities at ISPs under the guise of neutrality. Immediately there 
was significant resistance to creating interception capabilities at ISPs: ISP associations argued that 
the high costs and complexity would result in putting small and medium-sized service providers 
out of business (27). Australia has also had to deal with this; the costs and burden upon the 
operators have proved more difficult and expensive than anticipated. As a result, the carriers in 
Australia were given both a waiver from the requirement for several years and, it is understood, a 
subsidy towards the cost, which was not part of the original settlement. In a sense, the complexity 
of networks and the costs resisted the new policy habitat, established under the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. 
 Technological circumvention: Products and services such as Anonymizer.com, Hushmail, and the 
Freedom Network already pose a theoretical challenge for governments to ascertain transactional 
data and intercept communications. All three services offer e-mail that is off-shore, or secured in a 
manner that makes interception impractical. Government Access to Keys, however, still is a 
possibility to some extent within these products and services. However, the mass investment in 
fencing-in industry to comply with the new policy habitat could be to no avail if the determined 
criminal wished to act using such protection. Moreover, an intelligent criminal could circumvent all 
of these new powers without the use of these products and services, such as described in (28), and 
other methods are possible to circumvent Carnivore-like systems as well. 
 Regulatory arbitrage/competition: In the United Kingdom, when the RIP Act was about to pass 
the House of Lords, a number of ISPs announced that they were going to move off-shore (outside 
of the 'fence-ring') in order to continue to provide reliable service to their clientele. While the 
current status of these threats remains unknown, at least one financial institution is moving all 
decryption keys off-shore so that they can not be accessed by the UK Government. Such 
international arbitrage can be done because of the nature of the Internet itself: acting at a distance is 
at times as simple as acting immediately (29). So a decryption key that exists off-shore can be 
accessed by an appropriate user with relative ease to accessing it from the user's hard drive, but the 
former method prevents leakage to government agencies as most other countries do not have a 
GAK policy. 
New legislation and powers could be created to force compliance, as occurred with the TMI and NTT 
situations in the US, and technology can be banned such as the Freedom Network and Anonymizer. 
However, limiting access to services in other countries may be very difficult for governments to 
implement, particularly when these same governments are competing to be the worlds' best places for 
electronic commerce, as they see the economic benefits of openness. The alternative solution is to ensure 
that the world becomes consistent with the national policies. This would prevent regulatory competition. 
International arbitrage and settlement
After a long and heated battle within Parliament, the RIP Act was passed in July 2001. The debate in 
Parliament surrounded the disruptive capacity of technology, and the concerns about human rights and 
costs. In these last days of debate, a number of companies warned that they would move off-shore, 
supporting a case argued by a report from the British Chambers of Commerce. Relieved that it was about 
to be passed, the main Home Office Minister responsible for the Bill closed off the debate with the 
following statement 
Mr. Clarke: After the Bill receives Royal Assent, we shall work with the industry - and the 
Opposition, if they are willing - to promote it both in this country and internationally. Given 
the comments made in the overseas media, we must explain clearly what the Bill is and is 
not, and why we do not believe it poses a threat to e-commerce in Britain; on the contrary, it 
will help to achieve the Government's aim of a strong and secure e-commerce economy, to 
which we are all committed. 
Propaganda is needed, and I hope that the whole House will help to promote the interests of 
this country's businesses when the time comes. (30)
Insistent on not appearing as isolated in demanding such new powers, the Home Office often argued that 
it was acting completely consistently with the OECD guidelines on cryptography policy, with the CoE 
draft convention on cybercrime, the work of the G8 Lyon Group on hi-tech crime, EU Justice and Home 
Affairs Committee, and various countries including the US, the Netherlands, and Australia. (31) (32)
The Internet can enable users to send data across many countries, and this is also why it threatens 
executive powers of governments. Users can receive their messages from a server held in another 
country. So long as this is possible, it renders national powers of interception and access to transactional 
data challenging. If messages cannot be intercepted, then access to keys is moot (except in the case of 
stored data). Such activity can be controlled, i.e. data flows between countries may be shut down, but the 
technological systems (33) are disruptive: users can connect (at cost) through other countries or non-
regulated access points, and the economy would not look approvingly on restricting data flows in the age 
of e-commerce. This is the problem-space of the work of the G8 and the Council of Europe, particularly 
as they try to harmonise investigative powers and allow for mutual legal assistance across borders to 
overcome the technological challenges that remain the new policy habitat. 
G-8 World Tour: Lyon, Paris, Berlin, Tokyo ... 
At a summit in Halifax, Canada in 1995, the G7 created the Lyon Group, a Senior Experts Group on 
Organised Crime, which later expanded its tasks to include Transnational Crime, Terrorism, and Hi-Tech 
issues. In a July 1996, meeting in Paris, the Group of 8 agreed on matters including 
6. Note the risk of terrorists using electronic or wire communications systems and networks 
to carry out criminal acts and the need to find means, consistent with national law, to prevent 
such criminality. 
11. Accelerate consultations, in appropriate bilateral or multilateral fora, on the use of 
encryption that allows, when necessary, lawful government access to data and 
communications in order to, inter alia, prevent or investigate acts of terrorism, while 
protecting the privacy of legitimate communications. (34)
This was followed by a 1997 Meeting in Denver (35) where a ten-point statement of principles included 
 There must be no safe havens for those who abuse information technologies. 
 Investigation and prosecution of international high-tech crimes must be co-ordinated 
among all concerned States, regardless of where harm has occurred. 
 Legal systems should permit the preservation of, and quick access to, electronic data, 
which are often critical to the successful investigation of crime. 
 To the extent practicable, information and telecommunications systems should be 
designed to help prevent and detect network abuse, and should also facilitate the 
tracing of criminals and the collection of evidence. 
An action plan was agreed on that included 
 Develop expedited procedures for obtaining traffic data from all communications 
carriers in the chain of a communication and study ways to expedite the passing of this 
data internationally. 
 Work jointly with industry to ensure that new technologies facilitate our effort to 
combat high-tech crime to preserving and collecting critical evidence. 
This mandate for co-operation with industry led to the Paris and Berlin summits of May and October 
2000, and the Tokyo summit of May 2001, where industry representatives met with government 
representatives to discuss initiatives. Because of the disruptive technology of the Internet, and the 
associated costs accumulated by data collection and interception capabilities, the G8 acknowledged that it 
had to include industry within negotiations. 
These industry-government summits concentrated primarily on four topic areas. Two, specific to the 
issues covered within this article include 
Data Retention
To discuss issues associated with the feasibility of transactional data retention, and the 
degree to which these may facilitate the public safety mandate. This was met with firm 
opposition from industry particularly due to costs and data protection considerations. (36)
Data Preservation
To discuss problems associated with locating and identifying criminal communications that 
cross national borders, and the role that transactional data preservation can play in addressing 
those problems. This was met with scepticism, due in part to the challenges associated with 
identification of criminals (creating a user-IPnumber bind). (37)
Again the costs and effectiveness issues arise. Unless the design of systems can incorporate government 
interests then the costs will continue even as the effectiveness concerns abate; industry, however, appears 
resilient (at least openly) in designing systems that are embedded with surveillance capabilites, at least 
without subsidies. This is particularly difficult to do in a transnational manner. 
The G8 is continuing its work, and lately has been quite open regarding its concerns about data protection 
regulations that limit access to transactional data. That is, by data protection regulation, ISPs are meant to 
delete or make anonymous any transactional data that they hold when it is no longer needed for network 
billing and efficiency purposes. One proposal from the UK law enforcement agencies promoted the idea 
of removing this regulatory requirement, and substituting a retention of all transactional data for seven 
years (one year at ISP, six more at a government site) (38). Further proposals have come forward from 
the EU Police Cooperation Working Party, requesting reconsideration of data protection regulations (39).
Again the cost and privacy concerns arise, as disruption by the technology continues. The costs of 
retaining transactional data are considered high, moreover because this data must also be stored and 
backed-up. The invasiveness of this data has given rise to significant concerns for data protection experts, 
who continue to argue against it because of the level of detail and invasiveness. (40) (41)
Council of Europe on cybercrime 
Not entirely separate from the G8 process is the work of the CoE. Since 1997 this 43-member state 
organisation (and the observer states including the US and Canada) has been working on a convention on 
cybercrime. Only in April 2000 did it publicly release a draft (version 19), and since then has released 
four more drafts (as of June 2001, version 27 is the most current).
This convention has three intentions:
 harmonise substantive law across the member states, 
 harmonise procedural powers, and 
 create a standard for mutual legal assistance. 
The process of development, however, has been fraught with controversy about exclusivity, and lack of 
concern for costs (42) and civil liberties. (43) (44)
While this convention does not require transactional data to be retained, in other ways its powers goes 
well beyond those proposed by the G8 in risks regarding costs and civil liberties. For example, it requires 
that signatory states have the following procedural powers (relating to this article), 
Interception and real-time access to traffic data (Art. 21, 20) 
Countries must either require intercept capabilities or allow for technical devices to do the 
interception (similar to Carnivore, presumably (45)). 
Access to secured data (Art 19.4)
An ambiguous statement that states that authorities may require individuals who know how a 
resource is secured to assist in un-securing this resource. Although ambiguous, the UK Home 
Office stated clearly that RIP Act was justified as the CoE also required lawful access to 
encrypted data . 19.4 is thus ambiguously stating the case for GAK and self-incrimination. 
Additionally, the mutual assistance regime set up within the convention fails to harmonise safeguards and 
protections usually associated with due process. There are not even consistent requirements for dual-
criminality. As a result, countries can pursue criminals in other countries using techniques such as access 
to traffic data and access to secured data. This is so, even without the "crime" being a crime in the 
country enacting the powers. 
Just as the UK justified the RIP Act using the G8 and the CoE, industry and NGOs are also worried that 
this same rationale will be used in other countries, at least immediately within the CoE. These two 
initiatives do not consider the disruptive nature of the technology, the costs and the civil liberties risks are 
ill-considered, and similarly the clear possibility of circumvention. The momentum behind the CoE 
convention is practically unstoppable, however, particularly as there has been no wide consultation 
allowing for input that might well change the form or nature of the convention. Through the force of 
ideas, this convention on cybercrime could be signed as early as September 2001. Once this is done, 
national parliaments will have to implement the provisions in law with limited consultation again, 
naturally as 'it is required to be done', -- as the UK was the first to invoke. This Nuremberg defence may 
work; but sceptics will point that this may have been part of the plan all along. 
Summary and implications for technology policy: technology Acts
We are still left with this idea of disruptive technologies. Owing to the disruptive technology, the policy 
habitat of traditional surveillance techniques needed to be updated to maintain the status quo. However, 
in updating these powers, greater powers were granted through access to more invasive data (such as 
transactional data, and/or the Carnivore problem) or to powers previously considered in direct conflict 
with human rights (access to keys and secured data); this was necessary and implicated by the disruptive 
technology. 
However, structural issues arose. Old regulations such as the US Cable Act (and even CALEA) and Data 
Protection conflict with the new regulations or the new habitat; updates are naturally proposed, again 
because of the disruptive technology. Cost concerns and civil liberties became issues. These concerns led 
to reconsideration of even the new policies, as occurred in the Netherlands and Australia regarding ISPs 
and interception with respect to costs; and with Carnivore with respect to individual rights. Such an 
unfavourable new policy habitat was being proposed that the costs and client concerns prompted some 
industry actors to consider moving off-shore, giving rise to regulatory arbitrate, which is again enabled by 
the disruptive technology. 
Faced with the threat of disruptive technology that allows industry to move off-shore and criminals to 
transact across borders with impunity, propaganda was needed to ensure that other countries adopt the 
same regulations. The G8 and the CoE have been active in harmonisation of procedural powers such as 
interception, traffic data, and lawful access to secured data. In attempting to create a new global policy 
habitat they are realising that it is easier to harmonise powers than to harmonise civil liberties and cost 
structures; as a result the new global policy habitat leaves civil liberties and costs behind. Yet the force 
behind the idea of international conventions on cybercrime may be enough to stabilise the new global 
policy habitat despite all these detracting features. The force of ideas of international conventions and 
agreements also leaves behind democratic process, through ambiguity and through the imposition placed 
on governments to change its laws regardless of public consultation. 
Implications for national policies 
As any new country moves towards considering updates to its procedural laws involving surveillance to 
deal with disruptive technology, this article aims to point to a few reasons to consider carefully the path, 
the articulations, and the measures. 
Updates to maintain the status quo are not honest
Surveillance within new technological infrastructure involves an new policy habitat, with new 
repercussions regarding human rights and cost structures. The UK first stated that lawful access to 
secured data was not new; then realised that it was. Likewise, the US has stated for some time now 
that the CoE convention does not require changing any laws; they are now realising that this may 
not be the case. We are discussing new powers under new regimes, with new access to new data 
and new structures. While everything is almost the same, so much is different. 
The choice between technology neutral and technology specific policy is not clear-cut
The US pursued specific regulations under CALEA and is facing a situation where they may need 
to be updated to meet requirements of new infrastructure. Some solace can be founding that at least 
there was a negotiated settlement, no matter how complex: the US policy is the only policy with a 
clear subsidy mechanism, even though it is insufficient. A technology neutral approach is dishonest 
as it ignores the differences in technological implementations, costs, and effects on civil liberties. 
Consider how Australia and the Netherlands did not even allow for subsidies, then realised that re-
consideration was required for Internet infrastructure. If the choice is between simplicity and 
honesty, choose the road less travelled. 
Negotiated settlements are ideal, but often they are neither negotiated nor a settlement
The UK invoked the CoE and the G8 as a justification for the RIP Act, despite the fact that neither 
the CoE or the G8 was at that time negotiated, or settled. Inviting all the interested players to the 
table is of course ideal; this the G8 and the CoE failed to do. Therefore avoid the temptation to 
invoke the G8 or the CoE, otherwise a national policy will be nothing but the representation of the 
force of ideas coming from these trans-national institutions, rather than being democratically 
designed and nationally decided. Sovereignty appears to be more ideal. 
Settlements are not likely to occur
The technology remains disruptive; it continues have the capacity for recalcitrance. Technology 
policy is as much about technology as it is policy; likewise social structures and technological 
structures maintain equal capacities of autonomy. Much as regulations and treaties may fail, 
technology may force renegotiations. We are dealing with a technological structure that appears to 
be changing at an increasing rate. As a result, settlements are contingent, not permanent. Even if 
attempts are made to control the outcome of technologies, it is rarely possible in a democratic state 
to control the use of technologies in ways that were not intended; the cryptography policy debates 
should act as a lessons learnt on this abstract issue. 
Recognise regulatory arbitrage, divergence, and convergence within settlements
New regulations will collide with old regulations. The US is realising that CALEA and the Cable Act 
may well collide. Carnivore may also be in conflict with constitutional protections of the rights of the 
individual, or at least with ECPA. In Europe, the data protection regulations are on a clear collision 
course with the interests of retention of transactional data at ISPs. And GAK may collide with the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
The collisions may be favourable, but governments rarely deal with the Internet and technology in a 
manner that protects the rights of the individual. Rather, with fears spurred by issues such as child 
pornography, drug trafficking, terrorism, and hacking, old protections can easily be rationalised away. 
Yet we must realise: as much as these protections of rights are from an older time, these very same 
crimes existed in that time as well, and somehow we found it within ourselves to create those protections. 
Of course the technology is disruptive so we must question everything again, but particularly because the 
technology also disrupts these rights as well, we cannot let our immediate doubts and fears get the better 
of us and our processes. We were once wise, we must remain so.
Technology may change our policy structures, the policy habitats, and so we develop new policies. We 
must recognise that these new policies involve new capacities, again because of the technology, and these 
new capacities may conflict with old values and older capacities. Finding a settlement within this 
environment is not easy, but a negotiated settlement is required. Otherwise we will not be left to choose 
the outcome, and closed processes through technology or trans-national agreements will do it for us. 
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